





Law, Facts, and Power 
Elizabeth Thornburg* 
There is no logical distinction between statements which are grouped 
by the courts under the phrases “statements of fact” and 
“conclusions of law.”  – Walter Wheeler Cook (1921) 
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  While legal 
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 
supported by factual allegations.  – Justice Anthony Kennedy (2009). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 
In the context of a claim arising out of detentions of Arab Muslim men in 
the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the Court 
announced sweeping changes in its interpretation of the rules governing 
pleadings.2  Without actually amending the rules, without the advice of 
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 1. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 2. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), began the process but 
Iqbal confirmed that the Court’s changes are generally applicable and reduced a vaguer 
plausibility test into a two-jump hurdle that all plaintiffs must clear. 
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the Advisory Committee on the rules, and despite the opinion below3—
written by some of the most respected and politically diverse judges on 
the Second Circuit4—the Court formalized a new approach to evaluating 
the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint and the relationship between 
pleadings and discovery. 
In a déjà vu sort of way, the Court returned us to a world in which 
facially possible (no “little green men,” trips to Pluto, or time travel5) but 
very general allegations don’t count.  Here are the new marching orders 
for federal judges:  1) Identify allegations that are merely “conclusions of 
law” or “conclusory.”  Ignore them; 2) Take any remaining allegations as 
true, but if they are circumstantial—as they often will be, especially 
when “conclusory” statements are disregarded—look to see if they 
support a “plausible” inference that the plaintiff might be able to prevail.  
To be “plausible” in this sense, it must be at least as likely as other 
competing inferences, decided based on the judge’s own experience and 
common sense.6  If the pleaded circumstantial evidence is not sufficient, 
Iqbal instructs the trial judge to dismiss the case without allowing 
discovery. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is wrong in many 
ways.  This essay is about only one of them:  the Court’s single-handed 
return to a pleading system that requires lawyers and judges to 
distinguish between pleading facts and pleading law.  This move not only 
resuscitates a distinction purposely abandoned by the generation that 
drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also serves as an 
example of the very difficulties created by the distinction.  The chinks in 
the law-fact divide are evident in Iqbal itself—both in the already 
notorious pleading section of the opinion, and in the much less noted 
section on whether the Court even had jurisdiction over the case, which 
also turned on the distinction between law and fact.  Iqbal further 
demonstrates the power issues that lurk below the “law” and “fact” 
labels.  The Court’s invocation of “it’s all just law” allocates authority to 
judges rather than juries, and gives appellate judges the power to review 
those decisions with no deference to the trial court.  In addition, by using 
a case to change the long-established interpretation of a procedure rule, 
Iqbal allowed the Supreme Court itself to avoid the transparent and 
participatory process for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and altered the balance of power between the Court and Congress. 
 
 3. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 4. Id.  The panel consisted of Judges Newman, Cabranes & Sack. 
 5. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 6. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567; Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1950, 1951. 
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II. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY:  LAW, FACTS, ANGELS AND PINHEADS 
While each generation of lawyers may spend its time trying to 
correct the mistakes of the previous generation, it should not do so by 
returning to the errors of its grandparents’ generation.  The fruitless quest 
for the perfect pleading only of operative facts—not “legal conclusions,” 
and not “evidence”—was abandoned in the 1930s for multiple reasons.  
From a utilitarian perspective, it bred countless inefficient motions and 
orders and appeals about the sufficiency of pleadings, consuming time 
and money without much systemic benefit.  And from a jurisprudential 
perspective, the advent of legal realism demonstrated that the distinction 
was ephemeral.  One could as easily calculate how many angels can 
dance on the head of a pin7 as explain whether—for example—pleading 
that something constituted “valuable consideration” or that the defendant 
was “negligent” or that “B owes A $500” was a question of law or a 
question of fact.8 
The instincts of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
on this issue have been confirmed by modern developments in cognitive 
science and its impact on further philosophical debate about the law-fact 
divide.  It is theoretically possible to distinguish fact from law by 
defining fact as “a reality that exists independently of its 
acknowledgment by the conscious mind of a perceiver.”9  However, the 
legal system must operate within the limits of human language—the 
testimony of those perceivers—and people think and speak in terms of 
categories.10  Consider, for example, the comments of the drafters of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence regarding the conclusions that are embedded 
in everyday language, which they referred to as “non-evidence facts”: 
Every case involves the use of hundreds or thousands of non-
evidence facts.  When a witness in an automobile accident case says 
“car,” everyone, judge and jury included, furnishes from non-
evidence sources within himself, the supplementing information that 
 
 7. RICHARD BAXTER, THE REASONS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 530 (1667) (“And 
Schibler with others, maketh the difference of extension to be this, that Angels can 
contract their whole substance into one part of space. . . .  Whereupon it is that the 
Schoolmen have questioned how many Angels may sit upon the point of a Needle?”).  
The scholastic philosophers were not, of course, actually trying to count angels but to 
train students in abstract reasoning.  Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion assumes that 
abstract reasoning can lead judges to distinguish between law and fact, or conclusory and 
non-conclusory assertions.  See Ryan Patrick Alford, How Do You Trim the Seamless 
Web: Considering the Unintended Consequences of Pedagogical Alterations, 77 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1273, 1293-94 & n.98 (2009). 
 8. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 
COLUM. L. REV. 416, 416 (1921) (pointing to split between appellate courts on the issue). 
 9. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 866 (1992). 
 10. Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact 
and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 917-20 (1992) (responding to Lawson). 
  
4 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Penn Statim Vol. 114 
the “car” is an automobile, not a railroad car, that is self-propelled, 
probably by an internal combustion engine, that it may be assumed to 
have four wheels with pneumatic rubber tires, and so on.11 
“Car,” then, is a conclusion.  “Speeding” is a conclusion, as is “careless,” 
as is “negligent.”  To label some of these conclusions as “law” and some 
as “fact” is an arbitrary exercise, the choice of a point along a continuum 
of specificity at which something fairly general is labeled a conclusion, 
something fairly specific a fact, and something in between a mixed 
question of law and fact.  While commentators disagree about whether, 
at a philosophical level, there is a qualitative or ontological distinction 
between law and fact, there is a strong consensus that the distinctions 
courts draw are governed by policy rather than logic, and that they are 
not clearly and predictably drawn.12 
Because there is no clear line between questions of law and 
questions of fact, court decisions that turn on the distinction are a morass 
of inconsistency.  Despite sincere attempts to develop clear and 
predictable lines of precedent, cases differ for reasons that cannot be 
explained by some kind of inherent difference between an “ultimate fact” 
and a “conclusion of law,” especially in the huge realm of mixed 
questions of law and fact.  It should not be surprising, then, that the old 
code pleading cases forced to make those decisions generated thousands 
of cases but little clarity.13 
Negligence cases provide examples of where an insistence on 
disregarding “legal conclusions” could lead.  Many jurisdictions required 
quite specific allegations of factual theories of negligence, but permitted 
the pleader to characterize those allegations as negligently done, “and 
that characterization [was] held to show the breach of duty to plaintiff.”14  
Other jurisdictions—and this is apparently where Iqbal directs us—held 
that the word “negligent” adds nothing, and should be ignored.  One case 
following that pattern found that 
 
 11. Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Evidence Rule 201, citing KENNETH 
DAVIS, A SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL NOTICE BASED ON FAIRNESS AND CONVENIENCE, in 
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 73 (1964); Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts 
Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1956).  See also 
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 279-80 (1898) (“In conducting a process 
of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken without assuming 
something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do this with competent 
judgment and efficiency, is imputed to judges and juries as part of their necessary mental 
outfit.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Fact Reviews, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985). 
 13. Cook, supra note 8, passim. 
 14. Charles E. Clark, Pleading Negligence, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 486 (1922-23). 
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an averment that the persons in charge of a locomotive engine 
carelessly and negligently and without giving warning ran it at a 
reckless and high rate of speed upon a switch track where the plaintiff 
was at work, and negligently and carelessly disconnected a freight car 
therefrom, leaving it to run with great force against other cars on the 
track and forced them against the plaintiff 
did not adequately allege a duty to the plaintiff, because the conclusory 
terms “negligently” and “carelessly” were legal conclusions rather than 
facts.15 
The Court was not unaware of this documented historical confusion.  
Justice Stevens invoked it specifically in his dissent in Iqbal’s precursor, 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.16  Why, then, return to those problematic 
concepts?  Perhaps Justice Kennedy and the majority really believe that 
courts can distinguish in a disciplined and consistent manner between 
conclusions of law—which are to be ignored—and statements of facts—
which are evaluated to see whether they raise a plausible inference of 
defendant’s breach of duty.  If they believe this, however, they are 
choosing hope over experience.  History—decisions from the code 
pleading era as well as the Court’s own efforts—demonstrates that 
attempts to label various issues as law or fact are destined to fail.  The 
Supreme Court itself, in other contexts, has confessed that the law-fact 
distinction is problematic, calling it “elusive,” “slippery,” and 
“vexing.”17  Its efforts, for example, have resulted in anomalies such as 
these: 
 
• Damages:  the excessiveness of punitive damages is a question 
of law, while the amount of compensatory damages is a 
question of fact.18 
 
• State of Mind:  the issue of actual malice in a defamation case 
is a question of law, as is the issue of voluntariness of a 
 
 15. Chicago & Erie Ry. v. Lain, 83 N.E. 632 (Ind. 1907).  Flash forward and 
compare Branham v. Colgencorp., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037 (W.D. Va. 2009) (dismissing 
slip and fall case because plaintiff failed to allege how the liquid came to be on the floor, 
whether the defendant knew or should have known of its presence, and how the 
plaintiff’s accident occurred, citing Twombly and Iqbal). 
 16. 550 U.S. 544, 573-76 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 17. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (distinguishing the legal and factual 
matters with regard to whether a confession was voluntarily given); Thompson v. 
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (analyzing law-fact divide in a habeas corpus case); 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (considering whether intent to 
discriminate is an issue of law or fact). 
 18. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
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confession, while the issue of intent to discriminate is a 
question of “ultimate fact.”19 
 
• Fact Issues Treated Like Law:  the issue of whether a suspect 
is “in custody” (a “mixed question of law and fact qualifying 
for independent review”) and whether a movie is “patently 
offensive,” and thus pornographic (“essentially questions of 
fact”)20 get de novo review, which means that they are labeled 
as fact issues but treated as questions of law. 
III. ASHCROFT V. IQBAL AS EVIDENCE OF CONFUSION 
Even if we lacked this convincing history of dysfunction, Justice 
Kennedy’s own opinion in Iqbal is Exhibit A for the absolute un-
workability of the law-fact distinction.  The incoherence is clear not only 
in the better-known portion of the opinion, the one dealing with the 
sufficiency of Iqbal’s complaint.  It is also clear in another section of 
Iqbal itself—the one explaining why the court has jurisdiction to review 
this interlocutory order.  The language of the majority opinion creates 
illusory boxes of law and fact. 
A. Legal Conclusions in the Complaint 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion parses the plaintiff’s complaint and, 
viewing each allegation in isolation, holds that the following are mere 
conclusions that must be disregarded: 
 
1) Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and 
maliciously agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh conditions of 
confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] 
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate 
penological interest.” 
 
2) Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of this policy. 
 
3) Mueller was “instrumental in the adoption, promulgation and 
implementation” of the policy. 
 
These, on the other hand, were allegations of fact: 
 
 
 19. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); 
Miller, 474 U.S. at 110; Pullman-Standard, at 286-88. 
 20. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 102; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (U.S. 1974). 
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1) The FBI, “under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, 
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of 
its investigation of the events of September 11.” 
 
2) The “policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in 
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were 
“cleared” by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and 
MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” 
 
The four dissenting Justices (Souter, Ginsberg, Stevens, and Breyer) 
disagree.  They look at the complaint as a whole, and, considered in 
context, read Iqbal’s complaint as alleging quite specific facts that 
provide adequate notice to the defendants and adequate shape to the 
lawsuit.  In addition, the dissent points to inconsistencies in Justice 
Kennedy’s decisions about what is law and what is fact: “the majority’s 
holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be squared 
with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as 
nonconclusory.”21  Why are the first three allegations numbered above 
just legal conclusions, while the last one is an allegation of fact?  Nine 
justices.  Five vote legal conclusion.  Four vote factual allegation.  This 
is not an indicator of a clear line of demarcation. 
B. Interlocutory Appeal 
The first part of Justice Kennedy’s decision has been less noted, as 
it concerns the less sexy question of whether the district court order 
refusing to dismiss the complaint against Ashcroft and Mueller was 
appealable.  It was certainly not a final order in the normal sense, and so 
an exception was required to allow an interlocutory appeal:  the collateral 
order doctrine.  In the context of cases suing government officers who 
defend themselves based on a claim of qualified immunity, Supreme 
Court case law allows an interlocutory review of orders refusing to 
dismiss on immunity grounds, so long as the issue is a question of 
“law.”22 
Cases that the Court had reviewed under this exception in the past 
looked at the plaintiff’s pleadings to see whether the complaint alleged a 
violation of a clearly established law.  They thus involved an analysis of 
a legal proposition and its fit with the facts as alleged.23  They did not 
involve a question of the factual specificity of those allegations.  
 
 21. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 22. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); 
 23. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (considering the elements of a 
retaliation claim); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (deciding whether a Bivens 
claim can grow out of property rights). 
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However, the Court had also found interlocutory review unavailable in a 
case arguably more like Iqbal.  In Johnson v. Jones,24 the Court refused 
to allow immediate review of the denial of motion for summary 
judgment.  Johnson was based on an allegation that five police officers 
had beaten the plaintiff, and the trial court had refused summary 
judgment because it found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
three of the defendants participated in the beating.  As noted above, the 
special interlocutory appeal rule only applies to questions of law.  
However, a decision about whether there is a question of fact for the 
jury25 is defined as a question of law, so the Johnson appeal should have 
satisfied the “question of law” requirement.  In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy 
explains the Court’s refusal to take the Johnson case like this:  “Though 
determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact at summary 
judgment is a question of law, it is a legal question that sits near the law-
fact divide.  Or as we said in Johnson, it is a ‘fact-related’ legal inquiry.”  
So it turns out that fact issues sometimes infiltrate questions of law, and 
collateral orders are only final if they involve “abstract” rather than 
“fact-related” issues of law.26 
The Court then had to apply the “abstract” vs. “fact-related” 
question of law analysis to the lower court’s refusal to dismiss in Iqbal.  
Justice Kennedy concedes that “the categories of ‘fact-based’ and 
‘abstract’ legal questions used to guide the Court’s decision in Johnson 
are not well defined.”27  Nevertheless, he found it easy to distinguish 
Johnson from Iqbal:  the former required the examination of a “vast 
pretrial record,” while the latter considered only allegations within the 
“four corners of the complaint.”  Why that difference makes one more 
fact-ish28 than the other, the opinion does not explain.29 
It is unlikely that one could frame a convincing explanation of why 
facts in a complaint are different from facts in a larger record.  Yet by 
returning to the pre-legal realist world view in which facts and law are 
conceptually and functionally distinct, the Court has forced lawyers and 
judges to draw these lines in every case.  It is no accident that six months 
after Iqbal was decided it had been cited by courts 3312 times.  
 
 24. 515 U.S. 304 (1995). 
 25. This, of course, is another example of the strangeness of the law-fact distinction.  
Decisions about whether or not there is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the 
jury could draw the inference required by the plaintiff look suspiciously like factual 
decisions. 
 26. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Cf. “truthy,” the satirical watchword of political punditry on The Colbert Report 
(Comedy Central). 
 29. It can be explained, though, as an efficiency-based decision about interlocutory 
appeal.  See section IV, infra. 
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Uncertainty breeds litigation.  And no one should find that to be a 
surprise. 
IV. THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION ADOPTED BY IQBAL IS A JUDICIAL 
POWER-GRAB 
Why, given the problems apparent from history and from Iqbal 
itself, is the court going down this road?  In a word:  power.  In slightly 
more words, three kinds of power:  the power of judges over juries; the 
power of appellate judges over trial judges; and the power of the 
Supreme Court itself over Congress and the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  While talking about fact and law, the 
Court is aware that this distinction is actually about the allocation of 
authority to decide. 
In the past, when discussing the law-fact divide, the Court has at 
times pulled aside the curtain and revealed the real issue underlying its 
decisions.  The real question is not the nature of the issue but the choice 
of preferred decision-maker.  For example, in explaining why the 
voluntariness of a confession is a question of law, not fact, the Court 
noted that “the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination 
that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor 
is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.”30 
To illustrate the point, it helps to consider some of the contexts in 
which courts have identified particular questions as “law,” despite the 
questions being quite fact-intensive.  Sometimes they do so to give more 
power to the court of appeals than to the trial court.31  For example, in 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that the issue of whether a punitive damage award is 
excessive is a legal rather than a factual question, and so appellate courts 
should use a de novo standard of review rather than a standard that is 
deferential to the jury.32  And while the Court attempted 
(unconvincingly) to explain why punitive damage decisions based on 
moral condemnation and deterrence are not really factual, its real point 
was to assign the final decision about punitive damages to appellate 
courts.  In a similar way, the Court has treated certain kinds of facts in 
constitutional litigation—so-called “constitutional facts”—as if they 
were law, so they can be reviewed de novo.33  As Judge Easterbrook 
 
 30. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114. 
 31. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority 
Between Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the 
Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986).  See also 
Kevin Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 990 n.59 (2006) 
(discussing artificial nature of the law-fact line in review of jurisdictional fact). 
 32. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 33. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-91 (1935). 
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once explained, “That admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an 
issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ is reviewed without deference in order to 
prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from having far-
reaching legal effects.”34 
In other cases, issues are defined as “law” in order to allocate 
decisional power to the judge rather than the jury.  In patent litigation, 
for example, the Supreme Court has decreed that the question of the 
scope of the claim is a question of law, even though it involves drawing 
factual inferences from extrinsic evidence.35  The reason, again, is not a 
logical consideration of the difference between law and fact, but a 
decision that, for policy reasons, judges rather than juries are better 
equipped to make the decision, and because uniformity is desirable.36 
Both of Justice Kennedy’s law-fact discussions in Iqbal fit this 
power allocation model.  The two-step analysis of pleading sufficiency 
puts both steps in the “law” category.  The sorting of the complaint’s 
allegations into law and fact boxes is a question of law.  The decision 
about whether the factual allegations, taken as true, support a “plausible” 
inference is also a question of law.  Therefore, the judge rather than the 
jury will make these decisions.  If the case is appealed, the review of the 
trial judge’s decision about the pleadings will be reviewed as a question 
of law: de novo, with no deference to the trial judge.  The majority’s 
magic trick has thus privileged judges over juries,37 appellate judges over 
trial judges, and put the Court firmly at the top of the heap.38  The same 
results flow from Justice Kennedy’s placement of pleading issues in the 
“abstract” rather than “fact based” category of legal issues.  Appellate 
courts get to police the trial courts’ decisions, and get to do so 
immediately even when the trial judge refused to dismiss (and without 
the work of actually considering information revealed by discovery).  It 
is based on concerns about power and efficiency, not about how close to 
the “fact” line a legal issue strays. 
 
 34. A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 
(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining basis for de novo review of a district court’s finding based on 
empirical studies that a state abortion law would create an undue burden).  The doctrine 
of constitutional fact apparently derived from that of jurisdictional fact, a concept that 
allowed de novo review of facts on which the court’s power depended.  See Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 35. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 36. Id. at 388-91. 
 37. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1494683 
(2009). 
 38. Judging from the oral arguments in Iqbal, part of the Court’s rejection of 
managing discovery rather than dismissing cases comes from some Justices’ distrust of 
trial judges.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Transcript at 50, 61. 
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Institutionally, adopting a radical change in the interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure39 through the decision of a case also 
bypasses the normal collaborative process through which rules are 
made.40  Congress has the power, under Article III of the Constitution 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to make rules of practice and 
procedure for the federal district courts.  By passing the Rules Enabling 
Act, Congress delegated that power to the court, and later legislation 
creates a committee structure and a process for adopting and amending 
rules.  This process, however, is time-consuming.  It involves committees 
whose membership is meant to represent various constituencies within 
the bar, as well as federal judges from various levels of courts.  In recent 
times, it also involves empirical research designed to test the need (if 
any) for change and the merits of possible solutions.  Proposed rules will 
be published, posted on the courts’ website, written comments solicited 
and hearings held.  As the proposals move through the process, 
committees may delay decision or make changes.  Ultimately the 
proposal goes to Congress, which may if it wishes change or reject it.  
The Court’s only role is to pass the proposal along to Congress, and in 
the past it has done so routinely so long as the correct process was 
followed.  The Court thus has very little direct control over the content or 
timing of changes in the rules. 
If the majority of the Court has been hoping for a change in the 
existing complaint-discovery relationship, they had another source of 
frustration:  the Rules Advisory Committee has chosen not to do so 
several times already.41  Even if the committee, whose members are 
appointed by the Chief Justice, becomes more sympathetic to such 
changes, it would be at least two to three years before any resulting 
changes in the rules would become effective.42  Nor, except in the 
context of securities fraud claims, has Congress chosen to increase the 
burden of pleading by requiring heightened specificity or returning Rule 
 
 39. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448796 (2009). 
 40. See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. L. 
REV. 1655 (1995) (describing evolution of rulemaking process). 
 41. See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules 17-18 (May 3-5, 1993) (discussing the possibility of 
heightened pleading requirements for certain types of cases); Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Draft on Particularized Pleading 
(Sept. 17, 1993) (suggesting a variety of possible amendments to Rules 8 and 9 to 
magnify their requirements); Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 5-8 (Oct. 21-23, 1993) (continuing the discussion of 
possible amendments to restore heightened pleading requirements); Judicial Conference 
of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 17-18 (Apr. 20, 
1995) (discussing but rejecting at that time heightened pleading requirements). 
 42. McCabe, supra note 41 at 1671-72. 
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11 sanctions to their pre-1993 strength.43  If the Court wanted action, it 
had to take matters into its own hands.44 
Considered from this perspective, invoking the old code pleading 
concept of the conclusion of law is like waving a magic wand.  
“Imperio,” as a wizard in a Harry Potter book would say, and the judges 
have full control.  Without using empirical research about the prevalence 
of frivolous claims or the actual expense of discovery in most cases, or 
bipartisan input, or public notice and comment, the Court has handed 
federal judges up and down the line a powerful tool to stop lawsuits in 
their tracks. 
Even those who think this is a good idea should worry about the 
device (the law-fact incantation) that Justice Kennedy has chosen for the 
purpose.  First, it is logically the wrong one: 
there is no algorithm for generating correct conclusions about which 
is which, and so the courts muddle along attempting to rationalize a 
process whose primary purpose is allocative in terms of the nature of 
the entities.  There is thus a mismatch between task and tool, leading 
to the perfectly predictable sense of chaos surrounding the matter.45 
Second, it is extremely inefficient—a powerful but muddy doctrine 
creates incentives to file motions to dismiss in most cases, and dealing 
with those motions will require significant time and expense from courts 
and litigants.  Third, because decisions will talk about one issue 
(law/fact) but really deal with another (balancing access to justice against 
the cost of litigation), no clarity can result either pragmatically or 
ideologically.  It was a bad idea the last time, it’s a bad idea now, and—
ironically—Iqbal proves it. 
 
 
 43. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(Dec. 22 1995), did adopt heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud claims.  
However, other legislation failed to pass.  See, e.g., Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, H.R. 
420, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing amendments to Rule 11 that would apply in both 
federal and state court); Stop Trial Lawyer Pork Act, H.R. 7080, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 44. Some see this decision as part of a larger movement by the Court to chip away at 
the power of Congress.  See Simon Lazarus, “Congress Pushes Back as Supreme Court 
Oversteps,” Roll Call (Nov. 17, 2009) (also citing decisions regarding political 
contributions, proof of age discrimination, and arbitration clauses). 
 45. Allen & Pardo, supra note 11 at 1806. 
